The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting by Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE ROLE OF RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND









We thank two referees and David Leibsohn for their comments, and our respective institutions for their
support. This paper is an updated and translated version of  “Créances résiduelles et flux de rentes comme
mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats de franchise: compléments ou substituts,” Revue d’économie
industrielle, 2000, 92, 255-276. This paper is forthcoming in Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant eds,
The Economics of Contracts: theories and applications, Cambridge University Press, 2002. The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
© 2002 by Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©
notice, is given to the source.The Role of Residual Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting
Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud
NBER Working Paper No. 8868
April 2002
JEL No. L2, D2
ABSTRACT
Much of the economic literature on franchising has been concerned with incentive issues and how
these are managed in franchised contracts.  Two main types of incentive mechanisms have been
identified: residual claims and self enforcement.  In this paper we describe these incentive mechanisms,
and their use in franchise contracts.  We argue that although these two types of mechanisms are usually
thought of as alternative ways to align franchisee and franchisor incentives, they are in fact
complementary in franchise contracts because they address different incentive problems.  We explore
what these incentive problems are, and then describe specifically how franchise contract terms and
practices support each type of incentive mechanism.  Finally, we discuss briefly, via two examples, how
our analysis also applies to non-franchised systems with common marks or other reputation concerns.
Francine Lafontaine Emmanuel Raynaud
University of Michigan Business School INRA SADAPT and Centre ATOM (U. of Paris I)
701 Tappan Street INRA SADAPT, 16 rue Claude Bernard
Ann Arbor, MI 48104 75231, Paris cedex 05, France
and NBER eraynaud@inapg.inra.fr
laf@umich.edu1
THE ROLE OF RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND
SELF-ENFORCEMENT IN FRANCHISE CONTRACTING
I. INTRODUCTION
Franchising is a contractual relationship that has received a significant amount of
attention in the economic literature on contracting.  In large part, this is because franchising is
one of the few types of contractual relationships about which significant amounts of data are
available from public sources.  But franchising is also, as noted by Williamson (1991), a hybrid
organizational form, which lies somewhere between complete vertical integration and spot
markets.  Thus insights gleaned from the study of franchise contracts have allowed researchers to
develop a better understanding not only of this organizational form, but also of organizational
issues more generally, both within and across firms.
Much of the economic literature on franchising specifically has been concerned with
incentive issues and how these are managed in these contracts.  This literature has identified two
main categories of incentive mechanisms relevant to the franchise relationship: residual claims
and self enforcement. The former relates to the fact that franchisees get to keep their outlet's
profits net of the fees they pay to their franchisors, giving them incentives to maximize those
residual profits.  The second relies on the presence of ongoing rent at the outlet level, rent that
the franchisee forgoes if his contract is terminated.  Such rent are simply the difference between
the (net present value of) returns that the franchisee earns as a result of being associated with the
franchised chain and the returns he could garner in his next best alternative.  If the rent is
positive, and franchisors can terminate franchisees, franchisees will have incentives to perform
according to the standards set by the franchisor to reduce their chances of termination and protect
their access to the rent.2
In this paper, we describe how these two types of incentive mechanisms work in theory
and in practice in franchise contracting, and then explore the relationship between them. Our
contention is that rather than being alternative approaches to aligning the incentives of
contracting parties as suggested by much of the current literature, these approaches are in fact
complementary.  Specifically, we argue that residual claimancy rights motivate individual parties
to a contract to invest greater effort as per standard agency arguments.  At the same time, the
existence of self-enforcement mechanisms prevent parties from engaging in individually
profitable activities that can have a negative impact on the whole, or on other members of the
franchise system. In fact, it is precisely the franchisee’s status as a residual claimant that brings
about the need to use a self-enforcement mechanism to curb his tendency to maximize his own
profit at the expense of the brand or the rest of the chain.  We argue that optimal contract design
in this context must effectively balance the provision of high effort incentives for individuals
with coordination incentives that preserve the value of group membership.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe the theory behind the
two types of incentive mechanisms mentioned above.  In Section 3 we develop our main
argument on the complementarity between residual claims and self enforcement in franchise
contracts.  Section 4 describes more specifically how, in practice, various aspects of the franchise
relationship or contract clauses support the two types of incentive mechanisms discussed herein.
Section 5 illustrates, via two examples, how our analysis generalizes to non-franchised networks
of firms that operate under common brands or reputation concerns.  Concluding remarks are
found in Section 6.3
II.  RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND ONGOING RENT AS INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
Franchising fundamentally involves franchisors granting franchisees the right to operate
under their trademarks and business processes in exchange for various fees.  As the intangible
assets involved in this transaction remain the property of the franchisor, the granting of these
rights gives rise to incentive problems and agency costs.  As noted above, two main types of
incentive mechanisms have been identified in the economic literature on franchise contracting as
ways to mitigate these problems: the granting of residual claimancy rights, as emphasized in the
principal-agent literature (see e.g. Rubin, 1978, and Mathewson and Winter, 1985) and the
reliance on self enforcement, which involves the provision of a stream of ongoing rent
downstream that the franchisee forgoes in the event of contract termination (see in particular
Klein and Leffler, 1981, and Klein, 1995).  In what follows, we discuss the theory behind the
functioning of these two types of mechanisms in the context of franchising.
1. Residual Claims in Franchise Contracting
Franchisee-owned businesses are legally independent from the business of their
franchisor.  Franchisees can own one or several franchised outlets in a chain, and as owners, they
have a claim on the profits generated by their outlet(s).  Franchisees claim these profits net of the
usual sales-based royalties and advertising fees they pay to their franchisors.  As these payments
normally represent 6 to 10% of revenues, franchisees obtain the bulk of every additional dollar of
sales generated within their outlet(s).
1  Also, since royalty and advertising fee payments are
                                                   
1 In Product and Trade Name franchising, franchisees do not pay these sales-based royalties.  However, the markups
charged by the franchisor on every unit of input can be equivalent to sales royalties under certain conditions. See
Lafontaine and Slade (2001) for more on this.4
based on revenues and not profits, franchisees reap the full benefit from every additional dollar
decrease in operating costs.
When franchisee effort is not observable, and so cannot be contracted on directly, it is
optimal for the franchisor to sell the outlet to the franchisee for a fixed price (assuming that the
franchisee’s effort is central to production).  This outright sale makes the franchisee a full
residual claimant, thereby giving him incentives to put forth the optimal level of effort (see e.g.
Rubin, 1978, and Mathewson and Winter, 1985).  Specifically, assume that sales S depend on
franchisee effort in the following way:
S = ae + e ,
where e is franchisee effort and a measures the importance of the franchisee’s effort in the sales
generation process.  e  is a random variable with mean 0 and variance s
2 that prevents the
franchisor from inferring e from observed S.  If the cost of effort for the franchisee is C(e) = e
2/2
and F is the price at which the franchisor sells the outlet to the franchisee, the risk-neutral
franchisee will want to maximize expected profits, namely
p = ae – e
2/2 – F.
The first-order condition for this maximization problem gives e** = a, which
corresponds to the first-best level of effort and, thus, to the level of effort that the franchisor
would have chosen if she had control over it.  In that sense, selling the outlet at a fixed price to
the franchisee completely resolves franchisee incentive issues.  The franchisor can extract all the
profits from the outlet operations by appropriately setting the price, F, at F = a
2 /2.
2
                                                   
2 To simplify the algebra, we ignore issues of contract duration and discounting.  This in no way affects the
generality of the result that a fixed price contract resolves all incentive issues when franchisees are risk neutral.
Note that F could be set at any level not exceeding a
2/2.  But any F below a
2/2 means that the franchisor does not5
In practice, franchisees usually don’t acquire outlets at a fixed price.  Instead, they pay a
nominal fixed fee, plus a proportion of their revenues every period over the whole duration of the
contract.
  The typical franchise contract thus involves sharing.
 3  Yet, under our assumptions,
sharing is counterproductive - it prevents the realization of the first-best outcome.  In particular,
the franchisee who must pay a portion a of his revenues to the franchisor (where 0<a<1
represents the sum of all revenue-based fees such as royalty rates and advertising fees),
maximizes
p = (1-a)ae– e
2/2– F ,
by setting effort e* = (1-a)a.  In other words, the effort level e* chosen by the franchisee subject
to royalty payments is strictly lower than the effort level e** that a franchisee would choose
under a fixed-price contract, so one would not expect sharing to be used in this setting.
The principal-agent literature provides two alternative amendments to the model above to
account for the use, in practice, of sharing arrangements.  The first amendment, which is the
most traditional, involves introducing the assumption that the franchisee is risk averse rather than
risk neutral (see for example Stiglitz, 1974, for the first such model, applied to sharecropping).
In this case, the franchisee no longer maximizes expected profits, but rather expected utility.
Sharing in this model then becomes a means of shifting risk from risk-averse agents (franchisees)
to risk-neutral principals (franchisors).  The second amendment to the model relies instead on the
assumption that the principal (franchisor) provides some valuable input in the production process
and that her behavior, like that of the agent (franchisee), is difficult to monitor.  In this model,
                                                                                                                                                                        
make as much as he could, and the franchisee does better than required by his participation constraint. We come
back to this below.
3 Sharing occurs also, for example, in sharecropping, licensing, film distribution, and publishing contracts.6
called a double-sided moral hazard model, sharing arises from the need to provide incentives to
the franchisor as well as the franchisee (see notably Rubin, 1978; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985;
Lal, 1990; and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995).  We discuss each of these amendments in
more detail in what follows.
A.  Franchisee Risk Aversion
Where the franchisee is risk averse rather than risk neutral, he maximizes his expected
utility from outlet profits or his certainty equivalent income.  Assuming that e is normally
distributed, and that the franchisee has a constant absolute risk-aversion parameter of r, his
certainty-equivalent income is given by




where E(y) are his expected revenues.
4  Taking the first derivative of CE with respect to e and
setting that equal to zero, the solution to the franchisee’s maximization problem, as before, is to
choose an effort level e* = (1-a)a.  The franchisor then must choose a to maximize total surplus
taking for granted that the franchisee will provide an effort level e* = (1-a)a (i.e. an effort level












                                                   
4 See e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) p. 217.7




> 0.  In words, the “best” linear (or more precisely affine) contract from the franchisor’s
perspective now involves some sharing.  This sharing arises as a way to balance the need to
motivate franchisee effort (which makes the optimal a lean toward 0) while providing insurance
to now risk-averse agents (which makes the optimal a lean toward 1).  Of course, while this
solution is optimal from the franchisor’s perspective, it does not give rise to the first-best level of
effort and output as e* = (1-a)a < a = e**.
B.  Franchisor Moral Hazard
Turning to the second amendment to the model, we now assume that the franchisor as
well as the franchisee provides some non-observable input that contributes to the franchised
outlet production or sales process. In this case, even under risk neutrality for both franchisor and
franchisee – which we now assume for simplicity – the optimal linear contract will involve
sharing.
5  The share parameter here trades off franchisor and franchisee incentives.  To illustrate,
assume that outlet sales are given by
S = ae + br + e ,
where r is the franchisor’s effort level.  Assume further that the franchisor’s cost of effort is
given by C(r) = r
2/2.  The franchisee maximizing his profits given any a will again choose e* =
                                                   
5 If the franchisee is risk averse while the franchisor is risk neutral, as in our previous setting, sharing will arise as an
optimal response (under linearity) still.  In this case, the share parameter will play the double role of providing
incentives to the franchisor as well as insurance to the franchisee.8
(1-a)a.  The franchisor who gets a fractiona of outlet sales will set r* = ab.  Substituting these








The first-order condition for this maximization problem gives a*= b
2/(a
2+b
2) >0, which once
again implies sharing.
Three main testable implications arise from these two types of principal-agent models.
The share parameter a (here the sum of royalties and sales-based advertising fees paid by
franchisees to their franchisor) will be higher:
1) the lower the importance of franchisee effort, as captured by a above;
2) the higher the level of risk involved (s
2) (assuming the franchisee is more risk averse
than the franchisor);
3) the more important franchisor effort is, as captured by b above (assuming this effort is
non-observable).
The empirical literature on franchising has found support for 1) and 3), but not for 2)
6.
Our discussion thus far has focused on the incentives embedded in franchise contracts via
residual claims.  It is important to note, however, that employment contracts also can accord
residual claimant status to employees.  And an employee-manager whose compensation was
directly tied to the profits of the outlet he manages would choose the same effort level as a
franchisee as long as his contract entailed the same “level” of residual claims.
7  In practice,
                                                   
6 See Lafontaine and Slade (2001) for a review of the empirical literature on franchise contracting. Lafontaine and
Bhattacharyya (1995) discuss measurement issues related to tests of the effect of risk on royalties and extent of
franchising, and propose a theoretical explanation for the observed “reverse” effects based on the idea that measured
risk is a result of high-powered incentives for franchisees.  See also Prendergast (2002) for more on this topic.
7 See Lutz (1995) for more on this.9
however, franchise contracts normally entail residual claimant status for franchisees whereas the
compensation of managers of company units in franchised chains usually is not tied very closely
to outlet profits (see Bradach, 1997, for evidence.)
2. Self-Enforcement
In this section, we turn our attention to the role of hostages (Williamson, 1985),
efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1986) and self enforcement
more generally (Klein, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Klein and Saft, 1985) in franchise
contracting.  The common thread across all these analyses is the notion that parties to a contract
can be given incentives to put forth effort by making sure that they derive a benefit from the
relationship that is at risk if they do not behave as requested.  The incentives embedded in a
franchise contract in this context do not stem from residual claims, but rather from the combined
effect of three elements: (i) an ongoing stream of rent that the franchisee earns within the
relationship but forgoes if he “leaves” the franchised chain, (ii) franchisee monitoring by the
franchisor, and, (iii) franchisor ability to terminate the franchise contract.  Since the ease or cost
of termination is largely determined by the applicable legal system, the franchisor is left with the
tasks of choosing the level of ongoing rent to be left with franchisees and selecting the frequency
of monitoring so as to minimize the ex post cost of enforcing the desired level of effort.
8
Specifically, let Wt
1 represent the (expected) franchisee gain from deviating from the
franchisor’s requested behavior, a gain that may be the same from period to period, or vary
somewhat across periods.  Letting Wt
2 be the present value of ongoing rent that the franchisee
can earn within the relationship, a franchise contract is self enforcing if and only if Wt
2 > Wt
1 at
                                                   
8 For self-enforcement to work, the franchisor must be able to evaluate, ex post, whether or not the franchisee’s
performance is satisfactory even if the desired effort is too complex to specify in the contract.10
every t.  In other words, for the contract to be continuously self-enforcing, the franchisee must
have a minimum amount of rent to look forward to at each point in time.  For that reason, given
that the expected rent over the remainder of the contract decreases as the franchise gets closer to
expiration, Wt
2 must include not only this rent, but also rent associated with future additional
outlets and with the probability of contract renewal.
9
In this framework, specific contract terms (described in more detail in section 4) play
different roles (Klein, 1995), influencing either Wt
1 or Wt
2:
i) Contract Terms Affecting Wt
1:
Some contract terms specify certain franchisee obligations, for example the mandatory
level of input purchases from the franchisor, other procurement requirements, minimum
local advertising expenditures, or staffing levels.  These contract terms limit Wt
1 as they
make it easier for the franchisor to detect non-conformance and quickly intervene to limit
the benefit from deviation to the franchisee.  They also make it less costly for the
franchisor to rely on third party or court enforcement as they provide more objective
bases from which to establish non-conformance.
ii) Contract Terms Affecting Wt
2:
Other contract terms serve to ensure the existence of the stream of ongoing rent whose
potential loss gives incentives to the franchisee. Although Klein (1980, 1995) does not
specify exactly how the stream of rent is created, he suggests that clauses such as
exclusive territories limit intra-brand competition and thus contribute to the franchisee’s
                                                   
9 Indeed, only high performance franchisees can expect renewal and additional outlets within the same chain.  These
decisions therefore entail rent that gives further incentives to franchisees.  See Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) for
more on this.11
profitability.
10  As noted above, guarantees about future expansion opportunities and
likelihood of contract renewal would further affect the level of expected rent.
Due to a combination of uncertainty, complexity and lack of perfect monitoring, all
aspects of the behavior desired of franchisees cannot be specified by the franchisor in the
contract a priori.  Hence the franchisee always has some leeway, and Wt
1 is never zero.  As a
consequence, the contract must always give rise to positive rent Wt
2 if the incentive constraint
above is to be continuously satisfied.  At the same time, there exists a maximum amount of rent
to which the franchisor can credibly commit.  If the franchisor prefers franchising to company
managed stores, this is presumably because vertical integration (company management) is less
profitable, either due to higher costs or lower revenues or both.  In other words, Pt
F – Pt
I >0, or
the difference in profit between operating a unit under franchising and under company operations
at any time t, is positive.  The franchisor’s promise of rent to the franchisee then is credible if the
present value of the rent, Wt















where d is a discount rate.  If this condition is continuously met, then it is in the best interest of
the franchisor to pay the rent.
11  Otherwise, it is more profitable for the franchisor to vertically
integrate and appropriate the rent.
12
                                                   
10 This assumes that franchisees can earn profits in the long run, i.e. that they do not operate in a perfectly
competitive or monopolistically competitive market.  If profits were dissipated in the long run, there could be no
rent in the long run, and thus no self enforcement.  In other words, Klein’s analysis presumes that branding allows
franchisees to differentiate their product enough that they earn positive profits in the long run (which the franchisor
may or may not extract fully up-front – we come back to the issue of rent extraction below).
11 See Shelton (1967) for evidence that costs are lower under franchisee than company management.  As for the
revenue side, in a private conversation, a franchisor mentioned how, if he had hired one of his franchisee, he would
never have paid him a salary that amounted to anything close to what this franchisee was earning in profits in his12
Empirically, Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) have shown, through a detailed analysis of
the economics of McDonald’s restaurants in the U.S., that there is indeed rent left downstream in
that chain.  Following a similar methodology, Michael and Moore (1995) confirmed the
existence of rent in a number of other franchised chains.  Moreover, Brickley, Dark and
Weisbach (1991) have shown that the proportion of corporate units in franchised chains is higher
in U.S. states that restrict the termination of contracts compared to other states (see also Beales
and Muris, 1995).  Finally, Brickley (2002) shows that franchisors headquartered in states with
restrictive non-renewal or termination rules – and whose outlets are mostly in such states as a
result – charge higher fees, in total, than their counterparts established in non-restrictive states.
These results suggest that the cost of termination indeed affects franchisors’ decisions to
franchise or vertically integrate outlets or the terms of their contracts, thereby lending support to
the idea that franchisors rely on rent and termination in their dealings with their franchisees.
Finally, it is important to note that the use of rent and self-enforcement as an incentive
mechanism is in no way limited to the franchise context.  In fact, the huge literature on
“efficiency wages” in labor economics shows that the provision of “rent” and its potential loss
are used to motivate employees within firms just as they can be used to motivate franchisees.
This suggests that a franchisor could well use efficiency wages to motivate her store managers
and, in doing so, eliminate the need to give store managers residual claims or use franchisees.
                                                                                                                                                                        
outlets.  But the franchisor also admitted that he never considered buying back the outlets as he did not expect that
he could have made as much money with the units under corporate ownership as he was making in royalties given
this franchisee’s management skills and effort (and the franchisor did not expect the franchisee would have put in
anything close to the same effort if he had been an employee).
12 See Williams (1996) and Brickley (2001) for an argument that as the market changes, the amount of rent may
change in a way that makes integration the preferred option.  The franchisor who then terminates or does not renew
a franchise contract can be thought of as exercising the equivalent of a “call option.”13
III. SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS?
In this section, we consider why both residual claims and self enforcement coexist at
McDonald’s and in other franchise systems. This coexistence is puzzling given that the agency
and the self-enforcement literature each suggest that its incentive mechanism is sufficient, in
itself, to resolve incentive issues.
Specifically, the self-enforcement literature, and Klein in particular, never considers the
use of residual claims as an incentive mechanism.  In this literature, the combination of a stream
of rent, periodic monitoring and the termination option are sufficient to achieve the desired
outcome.  There is therefore no role for residual claims in the analysis.
Similarly, in the literature that emphasizes residual claims as a source of incentives, rent
does not enter into play at all.  If, ex ante, the franchisor has designed an optimal (linear)
contract, i.e. a contract that satisfies the franchisee’s incentive constraint as well as his
participation constraint, the franchisee earns no rent.  In some of these models franchisees do
earn rent, but these arise from the need to use the right share parameter, a, while also satisfying
some liquidity or selection constraint (see Mathewson and Winter, 1985).  The rent serves no
direct incentive purpose in these models.  Furthermore, as the contract is designed with the
franchisee’s optimal reaction in mind, the franchisee has no reason to deviate ex post, and the
final outcome is exactly what the franchisor expects it to be.
Why, given this, do we see residual claims and self enforcement being used together in
franchise contracts?  We believe that this coexistence arises because residual claims give
franchisees the incentive to put forth effort and not shirk, while ongoing rent give franchisees the
incentive to maintain the value of the brand by acting in the chain’s collective interests.  In fact,
our premise is that it is precisely franchisees’ residual claimant status that generates the need to14
use a self-enforcement mechanism that curbs the tendency of franchisees to maximize their own
profit at the expense of the overall chain.  In short, we contend that the two mechanisms work in
tandem and complement one another rather than being alternatives for one another.
But what are those behaviors that franchisees might engage in to increase their profits at
the expense of the chain?  Franchisee free riding on the value of the brand is one form of
franchisee “misbehavior” that has been discussed frequently in the franchising literature. The
issue, in essence, is one of externality: the franchisee bears the full cost of maintaining high
quality in his outlet, but the benefit of his behavior accrues not only to him in the form of high
outlet sales, but also to all others in the chain as well as to the franchisor as high quality in each
outlet leads to higher sales overall in the chain.  In that sense, the quality level that maximizes
the franchisee’s profits is always lower than that desired by the franchisor (see Brickley, Dark
and Weisbach, 1991, and Blair and Kaserman, 1994).  Similarly, the prices that maximize a
franchisee's profits are higher than those that maximize chain profits.  This again stems at least
partly from the fact that the franchisee does not appropriate the positive effect of his low prices
on sales at other outlets in the chain (see e.g. Barron and Umbeck, 1984; Shepard, 1993, and
Lafontaine, 2001, for more on this).  Finally, franchisees can refuse to implement new
production processes or to sell new products that they don’t expect will be profitable in their
particular market even if they are expected to be worthwhile for the chain, or they may choose to
modify processes or product offerings to better fit their particular market (see for instance
Kaufmann, 1987, and Lewin-Solomon, 1998). 
13
                                                   
13 Brickley & Dark (1987) also point out that franchisees tend to under invest in their outlets as they must assume
most of the investment risk.  While this effect is due to risk aversion rather than the presence of an externality, it
again implies that the franchisee may not act in the best interest of the chain as a whole.15
All of these franchisee profit maximization strategies correspond to “misbehaviors” from
the chain’s perspective.  To understand why, one need merely reflect on the franchised chain’s
“raison d'être”: to offer consumers a predictable, homogeneous product across a large number of
geographically dispersed establishments.  In fact, homogeneity is the goal not only for product
offerings, but also for building design, ambiance, service and price as this is at the heart of
sustaining the value of the franchised chain brand.  If a particular franchisee offers lower service
or less quality, consumers may well infer that overall chain quality is declining, and choose not
to frequent any of the chains’ establishments in the future.  Similarly, a franchisee's effort to
satisfy his local customers via special product offerings may affect the franchise chain negatively
if consumers become confused about what to expect, or are disappointed when other outlets do
not carry their favorite product.  In short, franchisees' efforts towards individual profit
maximization can adversely affect the franchisor and other franchisees by eroding the value of
the brand on which all parties in the chain depend, and thus adversely impacting the value of
group membership itself.
Our argument so far, however, raises an important issue: if the franchisee’s residual
claimant status leads him or her to behave in ways that are inconsistent with what is optimal for
the chain, thereby requiring the use of supplemental incentive mechanisms, why don’t
franchisors simply use self-enforcement mechanisms without relying on residual claims at all to
motivate franchisees?  After all, the self-enforcement literature implies that one can obtain the
desired behavior simply with an appropriate combination of ongoing rent, monitoring and
termination.
We suggest that the answer to this question lies in the different types of tasks required of
franchisees.  Specifically, some of the activities that franchisees engage in, such as all those16
related to day-to-day outlet operations, are very costly to monitor, especially for geographically
dispersed outlets.  Moreover, individual outlet sales and profits are fairly highly correlated to
franchisee effort for these types of tasks.  Residual claims are a particularly appropriate incentive
tool in such contexts, i.e. when output measures (here sales and profits) are good proxies for
effort and effort is difficult to monitor (see Lafontaine and Slade 1996 for more on this).
 14  By
contrast, a franchisee’s decision to implement or not new production procedures or new product
offerings, or to participate in various system-level activities, and more generally to comply with
explicit contract clauses such as those that govern supplier choices and minimum advertising
levels, are all fairly easy (low cost) to monitor.  The correlation between an individual outlet’s
sales and compliance by the franchisee with all these policies, however, need not be high at all.
If sales and or profits do not provide a good measure of such effort, residual claims will not give
franchisees the right incentives to implement them.  Franchisors will therefore do better using a
self-enforcement mechanism to get the franchisee to participate in these.
IV. SPECIFIC CONTRACT TERMS AND IMPLEMENTATION
So far, we have focused our discussion on the role of residual claims and self
enforcement in aligning franchisee and franchisor incentives without providing much detail as to
how these mechanisms are implemented or supported via specific contract terms.  In this section,
we briefly describe how specific franchise contract terms serve to implement these two
mechanisms.  We begin with residual claims.
1.  Franchise contract terms supporting franchisees’ residual claimant status
                                                   
14 Consistent with this, Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) present evidence that franchisors monitor the behavior of
their store managers much more often than that of franchisees.  Further, Bradach (1997) finds that the franchisors he
studies use elaborate supervision and monitoring schemes for their store managers, but that they shun the use of the
same mechanisms for their franchisees.17
Contract terms defining the financial obligations of franchisees, along with contract terms
that allow franchisors to ensure franchisee performance of these obligations, and finally
franchisee prerogative to transfer ownership of a franchise all contribute to establish residual
claimancy rights within franchise contracts.  The financial terms define the apportionment of
residual claims among parties to the franchise contract; the franchisor’s access to specific type of
information ensures that the defined apportionment of residual claims is correctly effected; and
the franchisees’ prerogative to transfer ownership of a franchise ensures that franchisees can
appropriate the current and future profits due to their effort and investments.
As mentioned in Section 3, residual claimancy incentives would be fully implemented if
franchisees purchased their businesses for a fixed fee only.  However, the optimal (second-best)
linear contract involves sharing when the franchisee is risk averse or when there is a need to give
incentives to the franchisor as well as the franchisee.  In that context, the financial terms that
implement residual claims in franchise contracts include not only the up-front franchise fee, but
also most notably the royalty rate and advertising fee, both of which are normally defined as a
proportion of revenues, and clauses specifying input purchase requirements when these inputs
are sold at a markup.
15
To the financial terms of the contract, one must add contract terms that allow the
franchisor to obtain accurate accounting and sales information to calculate royalties and
advertising fees.  Specifically, one usually finds clauses defining precisely the store revenue that
is subject to royalty payments and advertising fees. Other clauses indicate the method and
frequency with which the relevant revenue data must be transmitted to the franchisor.  Still other
                                                   
15 In some business-format franchises, the royalty rate or advertising fee is replaced by an ongoing fixed payment.
Abstracting from issues of termination or failure, these are equivalent to an upfront fixed fee from an incentive
perspective.18
clauses stipulate the circumstances under which the franchisor will be able to conduct his own
store audits and other forms of financial verification to ensure the validity of the information he
receives.
Finally, contract terms that accord franchisees the right to transfer their franchise to
someone else serve an important role in implementing residual claim as well as self-enforcement
incentives.  Franchisees usually own or finance much of the franchise’s assets (which may, or
may not include the actual building within which the franchise is housed), and can sell their
franchise (subject to approval of the buyer by the franchisor).
16  The ownership of the franchise,
and its inherent transferability through sale, makes the franchisor’s promise of future residual
claims (and related future rent) credible (Lutz, 1995).  As such, they give franchisees’ incentives
to invest resources and effort in future as well as current revenues and returns.
2. Franchise contract terms supporting the self-enforcement mechanism
As explained earlier, self-enforcement incentives require that contracting parties always
be better off by continuing to operate within the contract than by risking discontinuation.
Contract terms can implement this condition by increasing the expected gains from continuation
(Wt
2) and/or decreasing the expected gains from deviation (Wt
1).  The former involves increasing
expected ongoing rent through favorable financial terms as well as, potentially, entry restrictions,
lengthy contract duration, a high likelihood of renewal and a policy of allowing or fostering
multi-unit ownership among franchisees.  The latter involves restricting franchisee conduct
through terms stipulating, for example, specific operating procedures, acceptable input sources,
minimum advertising expenditure levels, or suggested pricing levels.
                                                   
16 Franchisors may also have a right of first refusal.19
A. Increasing expected rent (Wt
2)
The financial terms of the contract described above determine the apportionment of
revenues between franchisor and franchisee, and the amount of rent left downstream with the
franchisee.  In fact, as noted in section 3, once the optimal sharing parameter (sum of royalty rate
and advertising fee) is determined, there is a maximum fixed fee that the franchisor can charge
for the franchise.  This maximum fixed fee is equal to the present value of the expected returns
(ex post rent) of the franchise over the duration of the contract, given the chosen share parameter.
If the franchisor sets the franchise fee at this level, there is no expected rent ex ante from owning
the franchise.  There is, however, ex-post rent downstream which may suffice to ensure
franchisee performance.  If the franchise fee is set at a lower level than this maximum, there is
both ex ante and ex post rent left downstream in the franchised chain. The level of ex ante rent
earned by the franchisee in fact is exactly equal to the difference between the present value of the
stream of ex post rent expected over the duration of the contract and the initial fee.  Thus holding
the franchise fee fixed, factors that increase expected rent ex post also lead to higher expected ex
ante rent.
Restricting new entry into the franchised chain ensures a degree of ongoing market power
for individual franchisees.  In concert with the allocation of exclusive territories
17, such entry
restrictions limit intra-brand competition and thus increase the amount of ex post rent for
franchisees.  After setting the financial terms of the contract, it is therefore through the number
of franchises sold in each market that the franchisor most directly affects the level of revenues
                                                   
17 Various surveys indicate that in the US, about two out of every three franchisors offer exclusive territories to their
franchisees.  Furthermore, “master franchises” agreements all involve some form of territory.  Master franchise
agreements take one of two main forms: area development agreements, where the selected franchisee normally
develops and owns all the outlets on his territory, and sub-franchising agreements, where the “master franchisee” is
expected to recruit and support (i.e. play the role of franchisor for) franchisees he establishes on his territory.20
and rent for franchisees.  Moreover, these decisions determine the density of outlets and thus the
level of all forms of externality across outlets in the market.
 18
By using stringent criteria to qualify prospective franchisees, the franchisor also helps
ensure that chain homogeneity and quality, and thus franchisee rent, are maintained over the long
run.  The franchisor seeks motivated individuals with the demonstrated ability to manage the
day-to-day operations of an outlet while respecting the franchise chain’s restrictions and its rules.
Furthermore, to acquire a particular franchise, a prospective franchisee must satisfy certain
franchisor requirements, often including a minimum net worth and/or some level of prior
business experience.  During the training period the franchisor and the franchisee also each gain
important information about “fit.”  The franchisor can assess the strengths and weaknesses of
each potential franchisee while franchisees can determine whether the business activity and
franchisee role are right for them.  A thorough selection process and strong training program
screens out prospective franchisees whose lack of motivation or ability could erode brand value,
thereby providing current franchisees a measure of security against dissipation of their expected
rent.
The length of the franchise contract also affects the amount of rent franchisees can expect
to earn within the franchise relationship.  The average length of franchise contracts in the US is
about 15 years according to the US Department of Commerce, with most of them lasting from 5
to 25 years.  The main advantage of longer-term contracts is that the franchisee can count on
appropriating the returns to his long-term investments and is therefore more apt to make such
                                                   
18 Also, by granting franchisees several outlets that are close to one another, the franchisor may benefit even more as
the franchisee then internalizes more of the horizontal effects of his behavior, and free rides less.  Kalnins and
Lafontaine (2001) find evidence that franchisors do allocate outlets in ways that create franchisee-owned clusters.
Also, Brickley (1999) finds that area development agreements – contracts through which franchisees are initially
given the right to open several outlets – are significantly more likely to be used by franchisors involved in non-
repeat customer industries, where free-riding is especially an issue.21
investments.  In addition, all else equal, long-term contracts directly imply higher levels of future
rent (Wt
2) at least early on in the relationship.  On the other hand, long-term contracts may
increase the cost of self-enforcement by making it more difficult to “end” the relationship itself
via non-renewal or termination.  Courts may be more reluctant to endorse early termination of
long-term contracts, or they may require that franchisors compensate franchisees more when
they terminate such a contract, which would negate the incentive or self-enforcement nature of
the contract.  By contrast, a shorter-term contract makes it less costly for a franchisor to wait
until contract expiration and simply refuse to renew.  In this case, the use of short-term contracts
would enable franchisors to avoid termination and its associated costs altogether.
19  In sum,
decisions regarding contract duration must balance the need for franchisee investment and the
costs of enforcement.
Finally, the probability of contract renewal and the availability of additional outlets
within the chain play very similar roles as contract duration in the motivation of franchisees.
Specifically, renewal implies that the franchisee can expect his stream of ex post rent to continue
beyond contract expiration.  The higher the probability of this event, the higher is the amount of
rent associated with maintaining the relationship.
 20  As for additional outlets, they can also serve
to extend the period of expected rent ex post beyond the expiration of the first contract.
21
However, they can be even more valuable as an incentive mechanism if franchisees can expect to
earn rent ex ante from these (i.e. if the franchise fee or purchase price for additional outlets is
                                                   
19 Legal rules against termination imposed in some US states apply also to non-renewals, but the latter remain easier
and less costly to implement.
20 Franchisors often request the payment of a new fixed fee upon renewal.  This fixed fee should be deducted from
expected ex-post rent over the renewal period, and the result multiplied by the probability of renewal, to get an
estimate of the ex-ante expected amount of rent from renewal.
21 In fact, if the probability of renewal is very low, and the likelihood of additional outlets almost nil, the expected
rent of the franchisee, and thus his incentives not to free ride or damage the brand, will diminish gradually over the
duration of the contract.22
below the present value of expected returns from these generally, or for this particular franchisee
because he already owns other units in the same market and will benefit from additional market
power or efficiencies with the new unit).
22
B. Restricting the gains from deviation (Wt
1)
Most franchise contracts include terms stipulating that the franchisee must operate his or
her outlet according to the norms set by the franchisor in the operations manuals.  In fact, these
manuals and the detailed instructions they provide are often included in the contract by
reference. 
23  Moreover, the contract usually includes a clause indicating that the franchisor can
modify these manuals as needed.  The franchisor therefore can impose a large set of detailed
rules on the franchisee’s operations, and has the option of changing these rules in mid stream.
From an incentive perspective, these rules provide an evolving series of fairly objective criteria
that can be used to justify and facilitate contract termination.  They also limit the franchisee’s
opportunities to free ride and thus the profits he can obtain from free-riding generally.
Other specific contract clauses limit the franchisees’ options and thus increase franchisor
control.  These include input purchase requirements or approved supplier clauses
24, minimum
advertising expense requirements, and suggested prices.
25    Non-compliance with such
                                                   
22 See Kalnins and Lafontaine (2001) for further discussion of the potential benefits franchisees can derive from
owning multiple units in a market, and for evidence that large fast-food franchisors allocate new units to franchisees
such that each multi-unit franchisee tends to own a cluster of neighboring units.
23 Operations manuals are usually very detailed, to the point of including, for example, pictures of what plates
should look like when served in a restaurant chain, including the position of each item on the plate.
24 Siegel et al. V. Chicken Delight, Inc, 448 F. 2d43 (9
th Circuit, 1971) established that input purchase requirements
were a form of tying for business format franchisors as long as the inputs were a separate product from the brand.
As a result, business format franchisors in the US rely on approved suppliers rather than input purchase
requirements to control input quality. See Klein and Saft (1985) and Blair and Herndon (1999) for more on the issue
of tying in franchise contracting and its antitrust treatment in the US.
25 Resale price maintenance is per se illegal under US antitrust laws.  However, a 1997 Supreme Court decision has
made maximum resale prices for all intents and purposes legal.  See Blair and Lafontaine (1999) for more on this.23
restrictions is easily verified by the court system.  In that sense, their use reduces franchisees’
opportunities to maximize their profits at the expense of the overall system.
Finally, if all these clauses and control mechanisms prove insufficient to induce the
desired behavior from franchisees, or are simply too costly to implement, the franchisor can
choose to vertically integrate any particular outlet.  In that case, since managers are not typically
paid based on profits or revenues (and do not have a stake in future profits or revenues either),
the franchisor loses the incentive effects associated with residual claims.  However, an efficiency
wage can be put in place, and the store manager can be further motivated by the hope of
promotion, in the form of a transfer to an outlet in a more desirable location, or to higher levels
of the franchisor’s corporate hierarchy.  In fact, most franchisors own and operate a number of
outlets in their system.
26  In that sense, the option of vertically integrating outlets is a very viable
one.
In sum, franchisors use a number of contract clauses and incentive mechanisms that allow
the franchise system to benefit from the effort and dedication of the individual franchisee/owner
while limiting his or her ability to impose negative externalities on other franchisees or the
franchised chain.  Many of these clauses simultaneously support both types of incentive
mechanisms used in franchise contracting. For example, financial contract terms simultaneously
apportion residual claims and determine the amount of rent in the relationship.  Similarly,
sporadic audits are necessary to ensure that the revenues are declared and shared according to the
                                                   
26 On average, US franchisors operate about 20% of all their units, despite about 25% of franchisors operating none.
Similarly, in France, about 78% of all franchised systems include both franchised and corporate units.  See e.g.
Lafontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2001) for evidence from the US, Allam and Le Gall (1999) and
Pénard, Raynaud and Saussier (2002) for evidence from France.  Franchisors in Brazil operate an even greater
proportion of their units directly according to Azevedo and dos Santos Silva (2001). One finds a number of theories
in the literature as to why franchisors might want to combine company owned and franchised outlets within a given
chain.  It is beyond the scope of the present paper to review this fairly extensive literature, but see Lafontaine and
Slade (2001) for a review of the empirical literature on this topic.24
terms of the contract, and termination, an essential component of the self-enforcement
mechanism, is also the ultimate penalty imposed on a franchisee who does not fully disclose
revenues. In fact, it should be clear from the discussion above that the terms of franchise
contracts generally complement one another not only in their support of the two incentive
mechanisms discussed herein, but, fundamentally, in supporting the franchise system as a whole.
V. NON-FRANCHISED SYSTEMS WITH COMMON MARK OR REPUTATION
CONCERNS
So far we have discussed how self-enforcement (and the many contract clauses that
support it) work together with residual claims to give franchisees the right set of incentives.
Fundamentally, we have argued that the franchised system relies on rent to prevent the profit
maximizing franchisee from “hurting” the brand in his quest for higher profits.  But the need to
“protect the brand” or the system is not unique to franchising.  In this section, we illustrate via
two examples how our analysis also applies to non-franchised systems with a common mark or
common reputation concerns.
“Labels rouges” (literally red labels) are used in France to certify the high quality of
various agricultural products.  These “labels rouges” are government-endorsed marks that groups
of producers can collectively create and work under.  The creation of such a label requires that
all producers in a vertical chain be involved, and that these producers collectively define a set of
rules and specifications, codified in the “cahier des charges,” under which they promise to
operate (see Menard, 1996, and Westgren, 1999, for a description of the organization of
production under “labels rouges” in the poultry industry).  Different groups of producers within
the same agricultural sector can create different “labels rouges” with different rules and
specifications.  However, all of these must satisfy some minimum requirements to be approved25
as “label rouges.”  From the consumer’s perspective, the different “label rouges” can be
distinguished because they each have their own individual identity.  For example, in the French
poultry industry, there are now more than 80 different “label rouges”
27.
When they create a “label rouge,” producers must also organize and form a “Groupement
qualité”, which owns the collective mark and is responsible for the enforcement of the rules.
This “Groupement qualité” is fundamentally an association of producers, and all producers must
enter into a contract with this association before it can sell under this mark.
As each member of a “label rouge” is an independent and separate business, the
producers are all full residual claimants when it comes to the proceeds of their individual
businesses.  Consequently, they may free ride on the common mark or simply maximize their
own profits without necessarily taking into account the effect of their behavior on others in the
group.  Thus the group must institute incentive and control mechanisms.  And indeed, many of
the clauses found in producer contracts with the “Groupement Qualité” are best understood as
ways to make the contracts self-enforcing.  In particular, the “Groupement Qualité” has the right
to regularly inspect and monitor the behavior of individual producers, and the option to terminate
the membership of any producer whose production does not satisfy the rules and specifications
set forth in the “Cahier des Charges.”  Moreover, group members earn rent – they can sell their
product at a premium because the label effectively differentiates it and identifies it as a high-
quality product, and this price premium is protected by territorial exclusivity clauses (e.g.
territorial exclusivity for slaughterhouses within a given label) (see Raynaud and Valceschini,
1999 for details).
                                                   
27 For instance, “poulets de Loué” and “volailles de Challans” where Loué and Challans are different geographical
regions.26
In sum, the contractual structure of a “label rouge,” and in fact of production cooperatives
more generally, tends to be very similar to that of a franchised system.  Within these systems,
individual producers are residual claimants as franchisees are.  But the system also includes a
central entity that contracts with all producers, like the franchisor does.  This central entity also
monitors individual producer behavior to make sure they abide by the rules.  Finally, like a
franchisor, the central entity must be able to exclude producers that do not abide by the rules and,
as a result, cause them to lose access to a stream of rent.
In a similar vein, Arrunada (1996) shows the similarities between franchising and the
way in which “Civil Law” notaries are organized as a profession in Spain.  He notes that under
Civil Law, notaries provide private contracting services for which their customers pay them
directly.  However, these notaries also provide a public good in that they keep records and
perform research to ensure the validity of various contracts.  The effort they put in these
validation activities affects the quality of contracts in the economy, and thus entails significant
externalities.  The notary, as a residual claimant, would maximize his or her revenues by
focusing effort on the production of the private good only.  But without any validation activities,
the whole civil notaries system breaks down – the reputation of the whole system depends on
each notary doing a thorough job of validating and record keeping.  Arrunada (1996) argues that
rent, due to entry restrictions and price controls for notarized services, and the potential loss of
this rent, complement the incentives associated with residual claimancy and ensure the provision
of the public as well as the private goods.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The two types of incentive mechanisms found in franchise contracting are those related to
the franchisee’s status as a residual claimant, as captured in the principal-agent literature, and27
those related to self-enforcement.  The latter focuses on giving franchisees something to lose if
the relationship is ended, and combining that with some regular monitoring and termination
rights so that the franchisee will indeed have to worry about this potential loss if he does not
behave as requested.  The literature has generally treated these mechanisms as separate and even
substitute incentive mechanisms.  Yet empirically they coexist.  We have explained this
coexistence based on the notion of complementarities.  Specifically, we have argued that residual
claims give strong incentives to maximize profits, sometimes at the expense of the brand and
other group members.  The combination of rent and termination rights in that context are tools
that the franchisor can use to curb this profit maximization motive when it is hurtful to the
overall franchised system.  Similarly, relying solely on rent and termination rights would leave
the franchisor vulnerable to shirking by franchisees on the day-to-day operations as it would be
very costly for the franchisor to do the type of monitoring necessary to prevent this type of
misbehavior.  Since outlet revenues provide a good measure of franchisee effort for these types
of activities, residual claims are the more appropriate incentive tool for these.
Our argument that self-enforcement and residual claims go hand in hand in franchising
fits particularly well with Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1994) work on the role of
complementarities in the design and workings of incentive systems and with Corts’ (2000)
argument that agent asset ownership and incentive compensation are complementary when they
reward different tasks (while they are substitute when they reward the same tasks). 
28
Though we have focused much of the paper on a particular institutional setting, namely
that of the franchise relationship, the points raised here apply in many other settings where
                                                   
28 See also Athey and Stern (1998) on this.  Ichniwoski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Cockburn, Henderson and
Stern (2001) provide evidence of complementarities in incentive mechanisms in steel production and the
pharmaceutical lab context respectively.  Finally, Brickley (1999) considers complementarities between a few
specific contract clauses in franchising.28
legally autonomous businesses or otherwise owners of residual claims share a common brand or
reputation concern. Aside from production cooperatives and the system of public notaries
described above, one can think, for example, of firms involved in direct sales, of cartel
enforcement, and of labor negotiations with common unions as other settings where the need to
give incentives to individual members conflicts with the needs of the group and hence the value
of group membership.  Detailed work into the specifics of how these groups organize their joint
activities would be most useful in clarifying further the role of complementarities in contracting,
and cross-firm as well as internal organizational issues more generally.29
REFERENCES
Akerlof, George A. and Janet L. Yellen, (1986), Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market,
Cambridge University Press.
Allam, D. and P. Le Gall, (1999), La nature de la relation franchiseur-franchisé. Evolution,
perspectives et incidences stratégiques, économiques, et juridiques, research report,
Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne.
Arrunada, B. (1996), “The Economics of Notaries”, European Journal of Law and Economics, 3,
5-37.
Athey, S. and S. Stern (1998), “An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories about
Complementarity in Organizational Design”, NBER Working Paper 6600.
Azevedo, P. F. and dos Santos Silva, V. L. (2001), “Contractual Mix Analysis in Brazilian
Franchising,” mimeo, Federal University of São Carlos, SP, Brazil.
Barron, J.M. and J.R. Umbeck (1984), “The Effects of Different Contractual Arrangements: The
Case of Retail Gasoline,” Journal of Law and Economics, XXVII, 313-328.
Beales, H. and Muris, T.J. (1995), “The Foundation of Franchise Regulation: Issues and
Evidence”, Journal of Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance and Organization,
2, 157-197.
Bhattacharyya, S. and Lafontaine, F. (1995), “Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of
Share Contracts”, RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 761-781.
Blair, R.D. and Kaserman, D. L. (1994), “A Note on Incentive Incompatibility under
Franchising,” Review of Industrial Organization, 9, 323-330.
Blair and Herndon, (1999) “The Misapplication of Kodak in Franchise Tying Suits,” Journal of
Business Venturing, 14, 397-415.
Blair, R.D. and Lafontaine, F. (1999), “Will Khan Foster or Hinder Franchising? An Economic
Analysis of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance,” Journal of Public Policy in
Marketing, 18, 25-36.
Bradach, J.L. (1997), “Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains,”
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 276-303.
Brickley, James A. (1999), “Incentive Conflicts and Contracting: Evidence from Franchising”,
Journal of Law and Economics, XXXXII, 745-774
Brickley, J.A. (2001) “Evidence of Life-Cycle Pricing in Franchise Contracts” mimeo, Simon
School of Business, University of Rochester.
Brickley, J.A. (2002) “Royalty Rates and Franchise Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from
Franchising” mimeo, Simon School of Business, University of Rochester.
Brickley, J.A. and Dark, F.H. (1987), “The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of
Franchising”, Journal of Financial Economics, 18, 401-420.
Brickley, J.A., Dark, F.H. and Weisbach, M.S. (1991), “The Economic Effect of Franchise
Termination Laws”, Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIV, 101-132.
Cockburn, I., R. Henderson, and S. Stern, (2000), “Balancing Incentives: The Tension Between
Basic and Applied Research,” mimeo, MIT Sloan School.30
Corts, K. (2000) “The Interaction of Task and Asset Allocation in Multi-task Agency
Relationships,” Harvard Business School, Working Paper # 01-049.
Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal (1985), “A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture,”
American Economic Review, 75, 352-367.
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1994), “The Firm as an Incentive System”, American Economic
Review, 84, 972-991.
Ichniowski, C., K.L Shaw and G. Prennushi (1997), “The Effects of Human Resource
Management Practices on Productivity: Evidence from the Steel Industry”, American
Economic Review, 87, 291-313.
Kalnins, A. and Lafontaine, F. (2001), “Multi-Unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from the
Texan Fast-Food Industry”, mimeo, University of Michigan Business School.
Kaufmann, P. J. (1987), “Pizza Hut,” Harvard Business School Case.
Kaufmann, P. and Lafontaine, F. (1994), “Costs of Control; The Source of Economic Rents for
McDonald's Franchisees”, Journal of Law and Economics, XXXVII, 417-453.
Klein, B. (1980), “Transaction Costs Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements”,
American Economic Review, 70, 356-362.
Klein, B. (1995), “The Economics of Franchise Contracts”, Journal of Corporate Finance:
Contracting, Governance and Organization, 2, 9-37.
Klein, B. and Leffler, K. (1981), “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance”, Journal of Political Economy, 89, 615-641.
Klein, B. and Saft, L. (1985), “The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts”, Journal
of Law and Economics, XXVIII, 345-361.
Lafontaine, F. (1992), “Agency Theory and Franchising; Some Empirical Results”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 23, 263-283.
Lafontaine F. and S. Bhattacharyya, (1995) "The Role of Risk in Franchising," Journal of
Corporate Finance: Contracting, Governance, and Organization, 2,  pp. 39-74.
Lafontaine, F. (2001), “Retail Pricing, Organizational Form, and the New Rule of Reason
Approach to Maximum Resale Prices”, mimeo, University of Michigan Business School.
Lafontaine, F. and Shaw, K. (2001), “Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from
Franchising”, mimeo, University of Michigan Business School.
Lafontaine, F. and Slade, M. (1996), “Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and
Evidence”, European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 40, 923-932.
Lafontaine, F. and Slade, M. (2001), “Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision”, K.
Chatterjee and W. Samuelson (eds), Advances in Business Application of Game Theory,
Kluwer Academic Press.
Lal, R. (1990), “Improving Channel Coordination through Franchising”, Marketing Science, 9,
299-318.
Lewin-Solomon, S.B. (1998), “The Plural Form in Franchising: A Synergism of Market and
Hierarchy”, Working Paper, Dept. of Economics, Iowa State University.
Lutz, N.A. (1995), “Ownership Rights and Incentives in Franchising”, Journal of Corporate
Finance : Contracting, Governance and Organization, 2, 103-130.31
Mathewson, F. and Winter, R. (1985), “The Economics of Franchise Contracts”, Journal of Law
and Economics, XXVIII, 503-526.
Ménard, C. (1996), “Of Clusters, Hybrids and Other Strange Forms: The Case of the French
Poultry Industry”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152, 154-183.
Michael, S. and Moore, H. (1995), “Returns to Franchising”. Journal of Corporate Finance:
Contracting, Governance and Organization, 2, 133-155.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, (1992), Economics, Organization & Management, Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Pénard, T., E. Raynaud and S. Saussier (2002): "Dual Distribution and Royalty Rates in
Franchised Chains: An Empirical Exploration using French Data", working paper, Centre
ATOM, University of Paris I.
Prendergast, C. “The Tenuous Trade-Off Between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political
Economy, forthcoming.
Raynaud, E. and Valceschini, E. (1999), “Crédibilité d'un signal commun de qualité et structures
de gouvernance”, mimeo, Centre ATOM, University of Paris I.
Rubin, P. (1978), “The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of Franchise Contracts”, Journal of
Law and Economics, XXI, 223-232.
Shapiro, C., Stiglitz, J.E. (1984), “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device”,
American Economic Review, 74, 433-444.
Shelton, J., (1967), "Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency": Comment", American Economic
Review, December, 1252–1258.
Shepard, A. (1993), “Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics,” RAND Journal
of Economics, 24, 58-77.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1974), “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping”, Review of Economic
Studies, 41, 397-426.
Westgren, R.E. (1999), “Delivering Food Safety, Food Quality, and Sustainable Production
Practices: The Label Rouge Poultry System in France”, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 81, n. 5, 1107-1111.
Williams, D.L. (1996) “Incomplete Contracting and Ex-Post Opportunism: Evidence from
Franchise Contract Terminations,” mimeo, UCLA, Dept. of Economics.
Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firm, Market and Relational
Contracting, New York, The Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. (1991), “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete
Structural Alternatives”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 269-296.